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Summary findings
Varangis,  Larson,  and Anderson review the historical  problems  remain important development issues,  but that
relationship between  the work of applied  economists  and  appropriate  policy instruments are  largely separate.
policymakers  and the institutions that came to  Nonetheless  because governments,  households,  and firms
characterize  the commodity and risk markets of the  must all respond  to a wide range of sources of risk, they
1980s. These institutions were a  response to the harmful  emphasize the role for an integrated policy  by
consequences  of commodity market volatility and  government.
declining terms of trade.  But the chosen  policies and  Increasingly,  alternative approaches  have come  to rely
instruments relied on market  interventions to directly  on market-based  instruments.  Such approaches accept
affect prices or the distribution of prices in domestic and  the market view of relative prices  as immutable,  but
international  markets.  For practical and more  address directly the negative consequences  of volatility.
fundamental  reasons, this approach failed.  As traditional risk markets  (such as futures and insurance
The authors next discuss how a growing body of work  markets)  expand and new parametric  markets emerge,
contributed to a change in thinking that moved policy  the practicality of applying market-based  instruments  to
away from stabilization  goals toward policies that  traditional  risk and development problems  increases. The
emphasized the management  of risks. They distinguish  authors show the change in approaches  to risk, and the
between the macroeconomic  effects  of volatile  reliance  on old and new market instruments with new
commodity markets and the consequences  for businesses  and sometimes experimental  programs,  with special
and households. The authors  argue that both sets of  emphasis  on programs at the World Bank.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past dozen years, the political  institutions that characterize the markets of
internationally  traded commodities have changed  in dramatic ways. During that time,  approaches
based on certain types of government interventions that were  common for decades were reevaluated
and generally found to be  ineffective and unsustainable.  Related policies  and supporting institutions
that were originally put in place to foster development  came to be viewed  as impediments to growth.
Although past approaches  have been largely  abandoned,  how best to manage the negative
consequences  of volatile commodity markets remains a key issue for governments and policy makers
because traded commodities remain an important  source of export earnings for many developing
countries  and an important component  of income  and expense for the poor.
The purpose in this paper is to review the historical relationship  between the work of applied
economists  and policy makers and the institutions that came to characterize the commodity  and risk
markets of the  1980s. We discuss how a growing body of work contributed  to a change in thinking
that moved policy away from stabilization goals toward policies that emphasized  the management of
risks.  We illustrate this change in approach with new and sometimes  experimental programs, with
special emphasis on programs at the World Bank.2
EFFORTS AIMED  AT STABILIZING  SECTORS
By the 1  980s unilateral  and multilateral  interventions  in commodity markets were
commonplace.  Broadly, the goal was macroeconomic  and commodity  sector stabilization  and price
stabilization was the objective.  International  commodity organizations  employed buffer stocks or
managed trade with the intention of bringing order to unstable commodity markets.  The United States
used support prices and inventories  to manage  domestic prices.  The EU had a similar scheme but also
operated a special set of commodity-specific  exchange rates-"green rates"-for trade among EU
members.  Marketing boards and stabilization  funds were common in both developed  and developing
countries,  for example, wool in Australia and coffee in Uganda.  For developing countries,  lines of
credit were available at the IMF and elsewhere to support the operations.  How did this come about?
The reasons for past interventions are many and include historical and practical
considerations.  Akiyama,  Baffes, Larson and Varangis (2001)  discuss these in the context of coffee,
cocoa,  cotton, sugar and grains. However,  many of the interventions-especially  the multilateral
interventions-are partly explained by prevailing economic thought.
1  Authors are reverse-listed alphabetically;  all are with the World Bank,  Washington,  DC.
2 This paper was prepared as a background piece for a presentation in a seminar held to honor Ronald C.  Duncan on the
occasion of his retirement as Executive Director of the National Centre for Development Studies and Director, Asia
Pacific School of Economics and Management,  Australian  National University,  Canberra,  in  July 2001.  Several of
the themes taken up in  this paper relate to work that Ron Duncan initiated when he served in  the Bank as Chief of
the then Commodities Division,  and in  his previous  time in  the then Industries Assistance  Commission,  Australia..To a significant degree, many of the interventions can be traced to events at the close of
World War II.  At the time,  policy makers focused on ways to prevent short-term trade shocks from
turning into the wide-spread  economic decline that characterized  the Great Depression years. In an
age of gold-standard fixed currencies,  central banks were often challenged to manage  shocks in
export earnings.  At Bretton Woods, Keynes (1943)  proposed a world currency based on a price index
of the thirty most-traded commodities.  By linking currencies to the index,  commodity prices and
price-related  swings in trade earnings would be largely  stabilized  in an automatic fashion. While
Keynes'  ideas were not incorporated into the charters of the Bretton Woods institutions founded at
that time,  an alternative approach  to link lending with commodity volatility emerged.  A succession of
proposed internationally-backed  compensatory financing schemes followed the Bretton Woods
conference,  including the 1953  Olano Proposal for a Mutual Insurance  Scheme;  the 1961
Development Insurance Fund; the  1962 Organization of American States Proposal;  the Swedish and
Brazilian Proposals at the Committee for International Commodity Trade meetings and the French
Proposal for Market Organizations,  all in 1963.
Also in 1963, the IMF began to offer compensatory financing to countries experiencing  an
unexpected temporary  decline in export earnings.  The on-going program  is based on net export
earnings,  rather than a single set of commodities,  thus taking advantage of any natural portfolio  effect
that might arise from diversified  exports and imports.  With modifications,  this program remains the
primary instrument among the Bretton Woods institutions  for handling the effects of volatile
commodity trade.  Later, as part of the first Lome Agreement  in 1975, the EU offered its own
compensatory financing schemes,  STABEX and SYSMIN,  to ACP countries, but these have recently
been terminated.
In 1950 Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) independently offered the hypothesis that, because
of differing elasticities of income and demand,  prices for primary commodity exports would fall
relative to manufactured  imports. Consequently,  the net barter terms of trade for commodity
producing developing  countries would decline. This contradicted the long-standing notion of
increasing  scarcity put forward by Malthus and Ricardo  and Hotelling.  Soon thereafter,  the two ideas
were combined so that the "commodity dependency"  problem was characterized  by declining terms
of trade and volatile export earnings. Generally economists argued that instability of export earnings
limited development through adverse  effects on income, inflation,  savings and investment.  As a
consequence international  efforts were extended to key commodity markets as well. Later, Massell
(1969,  1970) would integrate these ideas into a model he used to estimate the benefits of stabilizing
commodity markets.  More than a decade later, Newbery and Stiglitz (1981,  p.  18)  would comment:
"The predictions  of the (Massell  1969)  model are readily derived  ...  and are quite precise: (i)
producers gain and consumers  lose from price stabilization  if the source of instability lies on the
supply side; (ii)  consumers gain and producers lose from price stabilization if the source of instability
lies on the demand  side; (iii) in both cases, gainers could afford to over-compensate  the losers,  so
there are net benefits  from price stabilization."
Although the economic arguments were challenged,  policies based on these arguments moved
forward.  Beginning in the 1950s, many governments  of commodity-producing  and consuming
countries took on the task of managing commodity markets through international agreements.
Proponents of the agreements argued that commodity-producing  countries  suffered not only because
of market volatility, but also because of declining terms of trade. Under United Nations auspices,  five
international commodity agreements were signed by producing  and consuming countries:  the
International  Sugar Agreement (1954); the Tin Agreement (1954); the Coffee Agreement (1962); the
2Cocoa Agreement  (1972);  and the Natural Rubber Agreement  (1980).  In 1968, UNCTAD  put
forward  a proposal that ultimately  resulted in a 1975 resolution calling for an Integrated Program for
Commodities,  covering ten core commodities.  The Common Fund for Commodities was established
to provide liquidity  for the integrated program. Moving more rapidly,  the IMF established  its Buffer
Stock Financing Facility on June 25,  1969.
Governments began to run domestic stabilization programs. In 1990, Knudsen and Nash
categorized prevailing  approaches.  These included:  buffer  stock schemes (examples at that time
included Bangladesh,  India, Indonesia,  Mexico, the Philippines  and South Korea);  buffer funds
(examples included Papua New Guinea, C6te d'Ivoire and South Korea);  marketing boards with
monopolies on trade (examples  included most of Africa,  India, Ecuador and Malaysia);  and variable
tariff schemes (examples  included Malaysia,  Chile and Venezuela).
CHALLENGES TO STABILIZATION APPROACHES
While the argument that volatility reduced investment and subsequently led to lower rates of
growth in commodity-dependent  countries was appealing,  economists  found only weak empirical
evidence of a direct link. Using data from Malaysian rubber plantations,  Caine (1954) challenged the
negative link between revenue instability  and investment. Later, MacBean  (1966) also challenged the
findings using cross-country  data, as did Knudsen and Parnes (1975). Deaton (1992) found that that,
for Africa overall,  expansion periods for investment  and ultimately GDP were greater during periods
of increasing export prices than were the contractions during periods of falling prices.  Conversely,
Dawe (1996)  calculated instability indices for a cross-section of countries by taking account of the
share of exports in any given economy and found that export instability was negatively associated
with growth and investment.
Increasingly,  economists began to wonder if the link between  low growth and volatile
commodity  markets had  more to do with government mismanagement  than private investment.  Gelb
and Bourguignon (1988) provided evidence from Venezuela  as did Bevan, Collier and Gunning
(1990)  for Nigeria and Indonesia. Moreover, Hausmann  and Gavin (1996) argued that uncertainty
over commodity-dependent  government revenues (and fiscal management)  had a cascading negative
effect on the economies of Latin America. Rodrik (1998)  argued that the link between short-term
economic shocks and growth was determined by the capacity of governments to manage the political
conflict over resources that such shocks initiate.
Some economists also argued that the benefits of stabilization were over-stated. In  1954,
Friedman stressed the importance of private savings rather than public stabilization  schemes in
solving the "producer income problem".  Newbery and  Stiglitz (1981)  argued that the Massell model
was flawed in ways that exaggerated the benefits of stabilization.  An important and frequent finding
is that the welfare gains that are possible from price stabilization  are relatively  small (e.g.,  Anderson
et al.  1981, Myers and Oehmke  1988, Wright  1988, Kannapiran 2000). Moreover, the practical
implementation of stabilization  schemes  raises many thorny problems to be overcome by program
administrators (Anderson, Hazell  and Scandizzo  1977). These include the difficult-to-assess  supply
responsiveness to induced stability (e.g.,  Just 1975, Griffiths  and Anderson  1978).
Early on, Bauer and Parish (1952) noted that the stabilization objectives of most marketing
boards were ill defined and potentially more of a guise for taxation.  Quiggin and Anderson  (1979,
1981) discussed the limits of price bands and buffer funds. Wright and Williams  (1990) noted the
wide-spread failure of domestic stabilization  schemes of all sorts and linked the failure to the nature
3of commodity prices and underlying models of storage. Examining the time-series properties of
commodity prices,  Deaton (1992) argued that the series tended to be mean-reverting-a  condition for
a successful  stabilization fund-but that the reversion took place over years; consequently,  successful
stabilization funds needed impractically  large lines of credit. Later, in a book edited by Claessens and
Duncan (1994), Larson and Coleman showed that, even with hedging,  commodity price movements
would eventually bankrupt stabilization  schemes.
But the most telling  criticism was the growing evidence that the interventions  failed to
accomplish their intended effect, most often because they could not be  sustained. The international
commodity agreements were unable to adapt to changes in the market,  and by 1996 the economic
clauses in them had all lapsed or failed (Gilbert  1987,  1996), victims of politics and economics
(Table  1).3 Funds dedicated to buffer-stock management  at the Common Fund have never been used
for that purpose.
Table 1. Historically,  International Commodity  Agreements  Have  Proven Unsustainable
Sugar  Tin  Coffee  Cocoa  Rubber
....................................................................................  ................................................................................................................................  ...... ...........
Initial agreement  1954  1954  1962  1972  1980
date
Status of  lapsed in 1963  collapsed in 1985  suspended  in  suspended in  Suspended in
economic  clauses  and 1983  1989  1988  1996; revived
1997; suspended
in 1999.
Number of  4  6  4  4  4
agreements
Source: Gilbert  (1995), and World Bank, files.
AN APPROACH BASED ON MARKETS
As the poor performance of stabilization  schemes became  more evident,  writers began to
emphasize the distinction between policies that attempted to change the distribution of prices
internationally  or domestically with policies of managing uncertainty  using markets for price risk.4
They also began to distinguish between macroeconomic  problems rooted in the ability of government
treasuries to manage  assets and liabilities,  and issues related to household vulnerability.
McKinnon  (1967) explored the use of futures markets as an alternative to buffer stocks. Later,
Gilbert (1985)  demonstrated that hedging on forward markets  could substitute for some of the
welfare gains normally associated with buffer  stocks.  Gemmill (1985)  argued that futures markets for
cocoa,  coffee and sugar would provide an attractive mechanism  for hedging export-earnings risks and
that forward contracts could be substantially  cheaper than buffer-stock operations.  O'Hara (1984)
looked at the use of commodity bonds to stabilize consumption. Rolfo (1980) investigated the use of
futures for cocoa producer prices and calculated the optimal hedge ratio in the presence of both
production  (output) and price volatility.  Overdahl  (1987) demonstrated the benefits of oil futures
3 Gilbert's (1996)  obituary for the commodity agreements  proved either premature  or precognitive,  since the rubber
agreement was briefly revived in 1997 only to be suspended in 1999.
4In the early  1980s,  Ron Duncan took several initiatives concerning uncertainty  in commodity prices,  including reporting
information on uncertainty in World Bank commodity price forecasts, and analysis of how uncertainty should be
handled in public project appraisal (Anderson  1989).
4markets for oil-producing  states. The volume edited by Priovolos and Duncan (1991)  brought
together thinking on the use of market instruments to manage government  debt. In that volume Myers
and Thompson provided a model of external  debt management that included commodity-linked
bonds.  Claessens pointed out that commodity bonds can be used to hedge debt-management  problems
associated with volatile export earnings.  Wright and Newbery proposed commodity-linked  financial
instruments to smooth commodity export revenue  and Anderson, Gilbert and Powell looked  at the
role of partial  guarantees and commodity contingency.
In 1994, Claessens and Duncan edited their second volume, this time showing how markets
could be used to achieve many of the sectoral stabilization objectives of many existing programs in a
sustainable  way.  In that volume,  market-based  methods were offered  as an alternative to unsound
programs in Costa Rica,  Papua New Guinea  and Venezuela.
About the same time, evidence  mounted that many of the interventions, put in place in part to
facilitate growth,  had instead become an impediment to growth.  This was due in part to the
stabilization policies that limited competition  and misdirected  resources;  however, it was also due to
the inconsistent  policy objectives of many developing  countries.  In many instances, the same
governments that sought to protect producers from the negative consequences of volatile commodity
markets  also taxed their producers directly  or indirectly to spur industrialization and favor urban
interests.  Influential  studies by Kruger,  Schiff and Valdes (1991)  and Mundlak, Cavallo and
Domenech (1993)  documented the negative consequences  of these policies and recommended
sweeping reforms.
As the end of the century  approached,  a series of events  and crises  launched a pervasive series
of reforms, undertaken  in part at the urging of multilateral  lenders such as the World Bank. Akiyama,
Baffes, Larson and Varangis (2001)  illustrate the rapid pace of these reforms for Africa, for instance.
While the reforms swept away many of the ineffective  institutions that were mandated to
stabilize domestic markets-for example the IMF eliminated its Buffer Stock Financing Facility in
February 2000-they did not, nor were they designed to, address two key remaining problems related
to commodity risks:  (i) the inability of some governments to prudently manage revenue and
expenditures that are volatile;  (ii) the high cost paid by vulnerable rural households-in terms of
forgone productivity-to limit the consequences of risks. We will return to some promising
approaches  after considering some more general aspects of rural risk.
ON THE DEVELOPMENT  OF RURAL RISK-MANAGEMENT  STRATEGIES:  SOME AUSTRALIAN
AND WORLD BANK PERSPECTIVES
Often,  early writers failed to distinguish between the sector and economy-wide  effects of
stabilization and the consequences of stabilization  for farmers.  An exception was a  1978 Industries
Assistance Commission (IAC) Report,  "Rural Income Fluctuations",  prepared under the Presiding
Commissionership  of Sir John Crawford.5 Lloyd and Mauldon (1986), for one  set of highly  involved
contributors to this debate,  have put this work in a worthy wider policy context.  Many observers
today recognize that an adequate risk-management framework must involve multiple strategies
(prevention,  mitigation, coping,  management) and arrangements  (informal, market-based,  public) for
dealing with risk,  and instruments that take  account of the sources and characteristics  of rural risk.
5 "Industry-wide  stabilisation measures,  such as various methods of price stabilisation,  are unlikely to contribute  greatly
to the stabilising of individual incomes."  IAC (1978, p.  62).
5The theme is clearly an important one for contemporary  development  and is so recognized  in the
2001 updating of the World Bank rural development  strategy (e.g.,  Anderson 2001).  Moreover,  since
strategies for managing risks can fail, understanding the limited capacity of governments,  firms and
households  to manage  risks is an important component of a social protection strategy (World Bank,
2001.)
Agriculture itself, a key sector operating  largely in rural areas, is an intrinsically risky
industry (e.g., Robison and Barry 1987,  Anderson and Dillon  1992).  Australia,  for one non-randomly
selected illustration,  is quite a risky  space,  especially in rural areas (e.g.,  Anderson  1979).  There is no
shortage of unpredictable  uncertainties that impinge on farmers and other business operators who
work in rural areas, not to mention those who supposedly  serve them in the various  legislative,
administrative, judicial,  and other domains of influence.  Since the type and severity of the risks
confronting farmers  and others everywhere vary greatly with the farming system and local
characteristics,  and with the changing climatological,  infrastructural,  policy,  and institutional settings,
there is a certain boundlessness to the issues.  This has naturally made the attention of governments,
NGOs and international agencies to such matters not only challenging but also highly varied.  Few
really general  (and worthy) prescriptions about strategies to manage risk are possible. The strategic
options considered here have, of course, been worked on extensively by agricultural  economists in
recent  decades,  and have been synthetically  examined  by Robison and Barry (1987), Huime,
Hardaker and Anderson  (1997) and, especially for developing  countries,  McConnell  and Dillon
(1997).
FORMAL MARKETS
Profit is the reward for risk-taking,  therefore any profit seekers in the business of farming,  or
in any other business,  must be prepared to bear some risk. Ways of establishing which risks are
bearable  and which are not for a particular  farmer are the heartland of agricultural decision
analysis/risk analysis/policy analysis (e.g., Anderson,  Dillon and Hardaker  1977).  While virtually
every decision will have risky consequences,  it is clear that not every decision exposes a business or
dependent household to "unbearable"  risk. Many decisions can be made by basing choice on some
notion of expected return.
The fact that returns from different activities are typically strongly  positively correlated limits
the gains from diversification  on farm. Better opportunities to spread risks may lie in spatial
diversification,  although this type of diversification  in its most extreme form is open only to the
largest businesses. Investments  in off-farm activities may provide  an effective risk-spreading  avenue
that should not be overlooked by strategists, even for relatively poor farmers. There is strong
evidence that farmers in poor rural communities are risk-averse and take actions that result in lower,
but more  stable incomes.  (See, for example,  Moscardi and  de Janvry,  1977; Dillon and Scandizzo,
1978; Just and Pope,  1978;Binswanger,  1980; Antle,  1987; Rosenzweig and Binswanger,  1993;
Gautam,  Hazell and Alderman,  1994; Ellis 1998, Reardon  1997, 2000). For example,  farm families
often diversify income  sources, engaging in such non-farm activities as agricultural  processing,
providing  services such as construction and repair,  and small-scale  manufacturing.  These various
imperfect mechanisms  for risk management  mean that there may be a case for assisting stressed rural
households  directly.  As the IAC (1978) investigation revealed,  such intervention should be
approached  carefully and rather cautiously, beyond broad social-protection  economy-wide measures.
However,  before turning to a discussion of interventions  to supplement the capacity of households to
6manage risk, we review briefly the ways in which rural  households can and do manage pervasive
risks.
Debt and savings. The way a farm business uses debt (and savings) can have major
implications  for risk exposure (Barry and Baker  1984). This was brought out strongly in the IAC RIF
reference,  and extensive use was made of the then-recent  piece by Baker (1974) on variable
amortization  schemes.  A key concept in regard to financial risk exposure  is financial  leverage,
defined as the use of credit and other fixed-obligation  financing relative to the use of equity capital
(Robison and Barry 1987,  chapter  16).  Increases in financial leverage  magnify the impact of
variability of firm returns from the point of view of the owner. If the return on total assets is above
the borrowing rate, the rate of return on the owner's equity will be increased,  and conversely, if the
overall rate of return is less than the borrowing rate, the owner will  suffer, in the extreme case
receiving  a negative rate of return on equity.  Given  a run of bad years, the farmer may reach the limit
on borrowing  set by the bank, or may run up more debt than can be serviced,  especially if there is a
persistent downturn  in farm profitability.  Such situations can obviously lead to bankruptcy.  It is
recognized  as unwise to borrow to the limit of available credit set by lending institutions since
holding a credit reserve  can be a way to provide  liquidity to get a business through troubled times.
However, while the direct costs of holding a credit reserve are usually low, the opportunity costs,  in
terms of the return on the forgone investment,  may be considerable.
Price-pooling. In many countries,  farmers have the opportunity,  if not an obligation in some
cases,  to reduce price risks through various marketing arrangements.  The most important alternatives,
from a risk-management  perspective,  include cooperative  marketing  with price pooling,  forward
contracts for commodity  sales or for input delivery, and hedging on futures markets (Varangis  and
Larson  1996, and other sections of this chapter).  Of these, price-pooling  arrangements are usually the
least effective for risk management.  They operate by a group of farmers collectively buying their
inputs or selling their outputs through a cooperative or marketing board. Membership of the selling
group may be voluntary or compulsory.  The price-pooling arrangements  may be operated in various
ways but are generally  designed to protect the individual from short-term fluctuations in prices by
some form of averaging.  There  may also be claimed advantages  from increased  market power and
economies  of size, leading to lower input prices or higher product prices than could be obtained by
the individual, but these benefits, if they do indeed  exist,  will be at least partially offset by the
administrative  costs of the scheme.
Forward  contracting  of sales or purchases  is a much more effective  and relatively widely
used form of risk management for farmers,  the most common being a contract for the sale of a crop.
The contract is written,  perhaps at planting time, or maybe later in the season, between the farmer and
the purchaser of the product,  agreeing on a price (or a basis for determining a price, such as a price
scale according to grade).  The contract may stipulate the quantity of produce to be delivered by the
farmer,  or may relate to the whole production,  which will obviously depend on the yield.  Of course,
the price offered is likely to be discounted below the generally expected  price for the future delivery
date, since the merchant is taking a risk of loss should the market drop between the contract date and
the delivery date. However,  elevator operators  in the USA, for instance, routinely hedge their own
risks and this is passed  on to farmers at quite low cost (Harwood  et al.  1999, p.  75). A risk-averse
farmer alone may,  however,  also be willing to accept a discounted price for the security of an assured
price for the product. Personal assessment will be needed to determine whether or not a contract offer
should be accepted.  Depending on the details of the contract and the size of the harvest realized, it
7may be necessary for the farmer to purchase  on the market to meet the contracted  delivery
requirements.
Hedging on afutures market is rather similar to forward  selling on contract but with a number
of differences.  One important difference  is that the futures contracts are standardized  contracts that
are widely traded, so prices are more competitively determined than for a specific contract between  a
single farmer and a single merchant.  That might mean that the farmer  could get a better deal by
hedging on the futures market than by selling forward on contract.  Not that risk can be totally dodged
in such trading.  The basis will vary over time, and is a source of uncertainty that cannot be eliminated
by the farmer. For developing countries trading  on foreign markets, there is the additional
disadvantage of large variations in basis, consisting of ocean freight,  currency rates and possibly also
export subsidies.
Agricultural economists have devoted much effort to attempts to analyze futures markets
systematically and to show how risk-averse  farmers 'should' use such markets.  Yet the reality  is that
rather few farmers actually use futures hedging, probably  mainly because  of lack of knowledge of
how the market works.  Use by farmers even  in the USA is low (Harwood et al.  1999), and Gardner
(2000) thinks that this is because of the relative unimportance  of the agricultural share of the incomes
of the majority of relatively small-scale  farmers who gain most of their livelihood in non-farm
activities.  Moreover, there are in general  some limitations  to hedging on futures as a means of risk
management,  beyond the mentioned basis risk that cannot be eliminated. Prices for the grade of
product sold by the farmer may move somewhat differently from prices for the grade specified in the
futures  contract, creating a further source of uncertainty.  In many  settings it is necessary also to
examine simultaneous  use of insurance contracts.  Finally,  farmers must be able to finance their
futures trading operations.  They will be required to place a deposit with their brokers when selling the
contract, and will also face the possibility of additional (margin)  calls for funds to cover potential
losses should the futures price move against them.
The decision on whether to hedge hinges principally on the farmer's expectations about the
cash price at the date in the future when the commodity  is to be sold,  relative to the futures contract
price for that period. Harwood  et al.  (1999, p.  76) note that the extent of risk reduction achieved can
be quite small where variability of yield is high or yield and price are negatively  correlated.  For a risk
averter,  hedging will be attractive only if the more or less certain futures contract price is above the
expected value of the subjective distribution of future cash price by an amount more than sufficient to
cover the costs of the transactions.  If a decision  is taken to hedge, usually it will pay to hedge an
amount approximately  equal to projected actual  sales,  although, as with forward contract selling,  it is
possible to hedge only a portion of expected  sales.
INFORMAL MARKETS AND COLLECTIVE  STRATEGIES
These remarks about futures contracts  largely apply to farming in a country where the farmers
and others readily  have the option to trade in futures if they wish,  a situation that has not always
prevailed in the rural areas of many developing countries.  Access to futures markets is, however,
increasing around the world (e.g., Priovolos  and Duncan  1991,  Claessens  and Duncan 1993), but
even  so, it will be moot as to how useful futures markets are to resource  poor farmers who lack the
information  and financial acumen to take direct advantage of them.  It is likely that their access will
be indirect,  such as through their marketing cooperative hedging  future sales on their behalf (e.g.,
Claessens and Coleman  1993).  Indeed, this has long been the practice in some countries specializing
8in production of commodities for which there is an active futures market,  such as West African cotton
relative to the New York cotton futures market (Satyanarayan,  Thigpen and Varangis  1993). Analysis
has suggested useful possibilities for futures trading to assist in risk management in diverse
circumstances,  such as wheat in Pakistan (Faruqee and Coleman 1996) and coffee in Costa Rica
(Claessens  and Varangis  1993). There  is, as discussed below,  still a need to undertake further policy
and institutional work before seeking to introduce such marketing innovations.
Credit and risk-sharing  institutions are,  of course, widely available in industrial countries to
help farmers overcome  such risk problems. Farmers can usually borrow for production or
consumption purposes to ease the transition from good years to bad.  In many cases, they have access
to a variety of privately provided insurance against specific types of risks, and they can trade in
commodity futures and options markets.  In developing countries these kinds of institutions are
usually much more rudimentary,  and  are seldom available at all for small-scale farmers  or other
impoverished residents of rural areas. Developing-country  household studies confirm that farmers  in
developing countries  self-insure through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms including
diversification  of crops and labor, gift-giving, and income-and-responsibility  sharing Morduch 1998
and Fafchamps  1999). Using household  data, Paxson (1992) confirmed  earlier observations by Cain
and Friedman and showed that Thai rice farmers save most, if not all transitory income. However,
self-insurance can prove expensive (Robertson  1987)  and unreliable (Alderman and Paxson 1992).
For example,  returns to liquid savings can be negative  (Deaton  1991) or heavily taxed by inflation
(Fafchamps  1999).  Moreover,  self-insurance  schemes can fail when they are needed most,
particularly  in time of drought (Reardon, Matlon  and Delgado  1988).  In the extreme case,
households  are unable to command adequate food supplies.  Famines are characterized  by such
failures on a large scale (Sen,  1981.)
FARM RISKS, INCOMPLETE MARKETS,  AND  GOVERNMENT  INTERVENTIONS
The incidence of risk and risk-averse  behaviour in farming has been widely perceived to be
important for policy makers.  Fluctuations in farm incomes,  particularly  the risk of catastrophic  loss,
may present difficult welfare problems for farmers.  There  are also important spillover effects on other
rural households and businesses. Destroyed  crops and livestock reduce employment  opportunities,
with serious implications for the landless rural poor in developing countries,  and add to
unemployment problems  in other countries.  Destroyed crops and stock also lower farm output and so
reduce turnover for agricultural merchants  and agro-processors.  Moreover,  reduced farm incomes
have  negative multiplier effects on income  and employment for many rural non-farm businesses and
towns (Powell and Mandeville  1978, Haggeblade  and Hazell  1989).
Market failures seem to be most evident when catastrophic  events, such as droughts or
widespread floods, occur,  largely because of the "co-variation  problem"  or the problem of "covariate
risk".  In turn, event-related  failures  in markets for food and for storage can exacerbate shocks to
incomes and to food supplies (Ravallion  1997).  Catastrophic risks are often blamed for failures in
credit markets  including widespread defaults on bank loans (e.g.,  Yaron, Benjamin and Piprek  1997),
even in some industrial countries such  as the USA.  However,  it is often difficult to determine
whether loan defaults are really driven more by an inability to pay, or by the expectation that
governments, under political pressure, will provide debt relief in bad years (e.g.,  Anderson and Dillon
1988). In the past, governments  have too often responded to farmers'  difficulties by forgiving their
loans, which undermines the operation of the credit system and sends the wrong signal to farmers
about the need for them to take responsibility for managing their own risks.
9Despite the lack of adequate quantitative  assessments of the costs of market failures in risk
management,  and hence of the potential benefits from public interventions,  governments around the
world have implemented  various forms of risk-management  policies.  An assessment of experience
with these interventions  is now attempted.  Given the diversity of their nature,  and their proliferation
over time and geopolitical  boundaries, the experience of risk-intervention  policies is, not surprisingly,
diverse and varied.  Much of the focus of the profession of agricultural  economics has been on dealing
with instability inherent  in the sector,  especially following the USA-oriented writings of Schultz
(1945), Johnson (1950) and Heady (1952).  Fortunately,  it is not necessary  here to undertake a
comprehensive  examination of this experience  as it has been well reviewed  by authors such as
Fackler (1988), Rausser (1988), Anderson and Hazell  (1997), Harwood et al. (1999), Coble and
Barnett (1999),  Gardner (2000),  OECD (2000) and Tomek  and Peterson (2000), not to mention the
IAC (1978),  so the generalizations below represent  a synthesis of seemingly  cogent studies in the
field.
As already discussed,  for the fifty years following World War II, price stabilization was the
preferred  approach of most policy makers and the programs were expected to confer benefits to rural
households  as well as the economy generally. But there were other changes over this period that
surely had  many significant influences on the risk encountered by commercial  producers,  especially
those producing for an export market.  If the risk experience  of such producers is assessed by the
variability  in real domestic currency prices, the effect of the general  shift to flexible exchange rates
depends on several factors: the exchange rate variation, the good's own foreign currency price
variation,  domestic price level variation,  and the covariation between these three variables (Smith
1999). In the case of Australian wool,  for example,  it seems likely that producers suffered  less price
volatility following the floating of the exchange in  1974 (O'Mara et al.  1999), quite apart from the
later debacle of the Reserve Price Scheme for wool (Phillips and Bewley  1991,  Bardsley  1994,
Bardsley and Olekalns  1996). But to return to the post-stabilization  era, alternative  choice-based
approaches  have been suggested  and examined,  and these are briefly reviewed.
Crop insurance is provided or supported by the public sector in both industrial  countries and
developing countries.  The driving force for such programs often originates  in governmental  concern
about catastrophic  risks such as drought, or the desire to reduce the incidence of loan defaults to
banks.  The topic was raised as an important issue in the RIF investigation  (IAC  1978), which in turn
led to a deeper subsequent  analysis (IAC  1986).
An overwhelming factor is the incentive problem that arises once the government establishes
a pattern of guaranteeing the financial viability  of an insurance  provider. If the insurance staff know
that any losses will automatically be covered by government, they have little incentive to pursue
sound insurance practices when setting premiums  and assessing  losses (Wright and Hewitt  1994).  In
fact, they will find it profitable to collude with farmers in filing exaggerated  or falsified claims.
Yet another common reason for failure has been that governments  undermine public insurers
for political reasons. In the USA, the government has repeatedly undermined the national crop  insurer
(FCIC) by providing  direct assistance to producers  in disaster areas.  Why should farmers purchase
crop insurance against major calamities  (including drought)  if they know that farm lobbies can
usually apply the necessary political pressure to obtain  direct assistance for them in times of need at
no financial cost?
Price and revenue insurance. Various ideas have been floated for dealing with the downside
of commodity price variations without seeking  to change storage arrangements.  The proposals under
10test by the International  Task Force on Commodity Risk Management in Developing  Countries
(1999),  an initiative discussed  later in this paper,  are not intended to stabilize prices in real markets,
but rather focus on placing a floor under the prices of traded commodities  received by producers  in
developing  countries,  which have been  selected for testing novel arrangements.  Indeed,  a research
component of the effort  is designed to inform debate on emerging policy in this area.6
Disaster  reliefpolicy, or sometimes the lack of it, represents a significant opportunity for
public intervention, long the subject of policy analysis. There has been a tendency for emotion and
public outcry to drive a process that leads governments to intervene in ways that, with the wisdom of
hindsight,  are demonstrably ineffective  and distorting of individual  incentives to plan more carefully
for what in many situations are inevitable occasional bad outcomes.  Such planning would naturally
include selective  purchase of insurance  contracts,  as discussed  above, with the predictable  negative
consequences  for broad participation in formal insurance markets.  It is worth recalling,  from time to
time, that the world is indeed a risky place,  and the extent of resultant costs can be considerable.  If
governments rush to bail people out of the effects of otherwise-insurable  natural disaster risks
whenever there is political  clamor to do so, development of commercial  insurance  markets will be
fatally compromised.  Just where governments  should seek to position themselves relative to the
insurance market in sharing responsibilities has long been on the research agenda of public policy
(e.g.,  Kunreuther with others  1978) and continues to be today.
A distinguishing mark of a potentially  good policy is one that swings into action as needed,
without requiring (or even allowing) political largesse,  and yet provides  no disincentives  for affected
producers to do the best that individually they can to plan for and manage their own natural-disaster
(e.g.,  drought) experiences as they unfold (e.g.,  Anderson and Dillon  1988).  Australia, for instance,
now has such a system in place  for droughts (DPRTF  1990),  after a long history of at best
questionable  interventions  (Butler and Doessel  1979),  such as in fodder and livestock markets under
the rubric of assisting producers  in their drought management.
There is clearly an important job to be done in providing assistance to prepare for and recover
from natural or man-made  disasters that can result in great human and economic losses7. Indeed,
developing  countries suffer the greatest costs when disaster hits: more than 95 percent of all deaths
caused by disasters occur in developing countries;  and losses due to natural  disasters are 20 times
greater (as a percent of GDP) in developing countries than in industrial countries.  Poorly planned
development  can turn a recurring  natural phenomenon into a human and economic disaster.
For agricultural markets, catastrophes  result in multiple crop failure.  Such events have a
rippling effect throughout the local economies  as agricultural workers  and those employed  in
supporting services suffer income losses. However,  farm income losses associated  with the failed
crops can, in some instances,  be privately insured.  When parametric  insurance  is considered  - for
6 There are diverse views about the value of any such subsidized interventions,  e.g., "The management of commodity
risks has entered a new era with the global liberalisation of agricultural markets.  This liberalisation has strong
support within economic research,  which judges international  and domestic efforts to stabilise prime commodity
prices to be difficult, if not impossible,  to implement without subsidies, highly likely to be captured by special
interests,  and of unproven  social benefit. Research is  needed on the question of the social value of reducing price
uncertainty  and/or price variability and under what circumstances  or for which commodities  it is likely to be of
benefit".  (Duncan 1997, p.  442).
7  See Ravallion (1997)  for a review  of public action failures related to famine.  Examples include  governments that
inadequately  respond to food shortages - sometimes deliberately  so - as well as government market interventions
that enhanced the vulnerability of households to famine.
11example, temperature or area-yield  policies -the distinction between disaster relief and insurance - as
compensating mechanisms  diminishes;  however publicly financed disaster relief will create a
different  set of incentives than privately priced insurance that can induce risk-taking and other
problems related to moral hazard.  This has prompted  Skees,  Varangis and Larson (2001)  to suggest
that triggers for disaster relief only pay  out for rare events - with the corollary result that relevant
definitions of disaster will due to climatic and other differences.
The case of Mexico can illustrate these points. In Mexico,  the government  in 1996 established
a Fund for Natural Disasters (FONDEN)  for post-disaster financing  for reconstruction of public
infrastructure,  and compensation to low-income producers for crop and livestock losses arising from
natural disasters. FONDEN targets the beneficiaries  and has limits to amounts it disburses per
beneficiary.  The intention is not to compete with private insurance.  In addition,  more recently,
FONDEN has started to adopt objective rules for declaring  catastrophic events. This removes an ad
hoc dimension in the declaration of catastrophes  and reduces the political interference  in FONDEN's
operations.  Operating in parallel to FONDEN are a group of mutual  insurance  funds amongst farmer
organization.  These farmer organizations are calledfondos de aseguramiento  (fondos for short),
formed to provide mutual crop insurance to their members.  The fondos collect premiums creating
reserves to pay indemnities and cover operational  costs.  The fondos purchase traditional reinsurance
for times when claims deplete held reserves. However  analysis of historic reinsurance payouts reveals
that weather events,  similar to those covered under FONDEN,  are the primary source of systemic
payouts by the fondos
Other mechanisms are available to governments intent on easing the pain of dealing with risk
in various parts of the economic  system,  or at least sharing in the enterprise  risk. In an economy
where the income-tax system functions well, schemes  may be put in place that enable taxpayers,
including farmers, to manage their post-tax income  streams  in a manner that causes them less
financial suffering and presumably boosts enterprise efficiency in the face of variable fortunes  in
productivity and markets (e.g.,  Buffier and Metternick-Jones  1995). Where  some groups contribute
little to taxation revenues,  as may be the case with many farming communities,  there are obvious
limitations to such instruments as risk-management  mechanisms.  The idea of having mechanisms that
are neutral across sectors of the economy is, however,  virtuous.
One potential  such mechanism  is the credit system. In principle, having a financial  system
serving rural areas in a flexible manner that recognizes the riskiness  of life in such space is the best
single approach to helping  all concerned to manage their risks. Credit,  as noted above,  serves as a
useful,  largely self-managed  instrument in industrial countries, but is not so straightforward  in
developing countries,  where much agricultural  lending is tied to farm inputs and must be repaid at the
end of the season, even if it is a bad one. Credit to smooth consumption across years is rarely
available from the formal sector in developing countries.  This is part of the rationale for the proposals
noted above as being under examination by the International  Task Force on Commodity Risk
Management in Developing  Countries (1999), and variously discussed by others in recent years (e.g.,
Varangis,  Akiyama and Mitchell  1995, Duncan  1997,  Sarris 1997).
Commercial  banking institutions,  particularly those in developing  countries lending to
agriculture,  face considerable  risk in identifying "problem borrowers"  who have little intention of
repayment.  In managing their resources,  banks typically diversify across sectors  and regions,
maintain financial reserves,  establish contingent  loan arrangements with other banks,  and build up
personal relationships with their clients.  In times of stress they will work with a borrower to develop
a rescue plan of roll-overs,  interest rate adjustments,  and so on around the agreed collateral.  But such
12flexibility was seldom encountered in the traditional agricultural  banks, which were thus
correspondingly  vulnerable (Hazell  1995b).  One hope for progress was agricultural credit insurance,
but this too has met the fate of most crop insurance programs (Pomarada  1984,  Hazell  1995b), and
attention has now shifted to the possibly of loan-guarantee  schemes.  There is yet little evidence to
suggest that credit insurance  helps banks much, or that they increase the volume of lending to
agriculture  in general and to small-scale  farms in particular, but they may still  prove to be effective,
and more research seems warranted.
WORLD BANK INITIATIVES IN AGRICULTURAL  RISK MANAGEMENT
Two key conclusions of the debate over how best to manage risks is partly reflected  in World
Bank lending. The notion that many of the stabilization  programs,  of the type common in the  1980s,
were ineffective and at times and obstacle to growth,  is well reflected in the Bank's research and also
in the Bank's structural  lending.  The conclusion that some households are,  at times, especially
vulnerable to certain types of risks is also reflected  in research and in Bank lending for safety nets
and social protection.  However,  in recent years, activities at the World Bank have also been directed
at an unresolved question to the effect that, if households  and small firms in developing  countries are
especially vulnerable to certain types of risk, in part, because they have poor access to market-based
instruments for managing  risk, can the problem be mitigated,  if not solved, by extending the reach of
markets?
COMMODITY PRICE  RISK MANAGEMENT
The World Bank has long recognized  price volatility as an important problem for farmers and
rural households in general. In the mid- 1  980s, the Commodities Division of the International
Economics  Department started a serious investigation on the use of commodity price-risk
management instruments, such as futures, options  and swaps, by developing countries.
This early work culminated  in  1991,  with the publication of the book by Priovolos and
Duncan.  As discussed earlier,  the book argued that commodity price-hedging  instruments have been
used in financial markets of industrial countries and offer considerable  potential for managing
commodity price risks in developing counties.  These instruments have been little used in these latter
countries,  not because they are new, but also because  of the lack of understanding  and awareness,  and
countries not understanding their risk exposure.  The book focused on commodity-linked  financing
instruments,  such as commodity bonds and commodity-linked  securities. The focus was more on the
macro, country-wide  level,  rather than sectoral level and more on the theoretical/conceptual  side
rather than on practical  applications.
Following this early work,  several case studies were undertaken to demonstrate the
applicability of the approach.  This work was as much one of research into the problems of price risk
management to be resolved and issues to be discussed,  as it was one of actual technical assistance
(mainly awareness raising) to particular countries. Most of this early case-study work focused on
Colombia, Costa Rica, Papua New Guinea and Venezuela.  The book edited by Claessens and Duncan
presenting these case studies  and lessons learned was published in 1993.  The early test cases
demonstrated that developing countries can benefit  significantly from using financial instruments to
manage  commodity price risks. The work undertaken argues that the fact that very few developing
countries or entities in these countries have used these instruments "...  is attributed to a lack of
awareness of the risks that are faced; to a lack of knowledge  of the potential use of market
13instruments;  to domestic regulatory,  institutional,  and legal constraints; and to considerations in the
marketplace regarding the countries'  creditworthiness.  The obvious conclusions are that technical
assistance,  training and education,  and credit enhancement by third parties are necessary to allow
developing countries to benefit fully from the use of these instruments."
The early work by the World Bank both on the theoretical/conceptual  front (Priovolos and
Duncan  1991) and applications (Claessens and Duncan  1993)  contributed to increasing  the visibility
of commodity price-risk management  not only within the World Bank group but also among the
development  community (e.g.,  CFC, FAO, UNCTAD, donor governments).  In 1999, the World Bank
became the catalyst for the establishment of the International Task Force (ITF) on Commodity Risk
Management  that was convened to evaluate the feasibility of providing small producers  access to
risk-management  instruments and services in developed  countries.  The ITF is a partnership  which
brings together a broad representation of international  institutions, producer and consumer
organizations,  and private sector entities.  ITF focused  on the actual delivery of price-risk-
management  instruments to small farmers.  The major challenge of the ITF work is to find a local
institution that can capably  aggregate enough volume from many small farmers to access the
international  market for risk management instruments.
To demonstrate how this will actually work,  in 2000 the ITF initiated  feasibility  studies to
evaluate, in some depth,  the feasibility of making price risk management instruments  available to
producers in developing countries.  These test cases look at the existence  of producer organizations
that could purchase price insurance for their members.  The risk-management  instrument proposed in
the ITF work is the purchase of put options by producers, because of the limited exposure to counter
party (credit) risk; that is,  as long as the producer purchases the option, there is no risk. And if the
producer defers the payment of the option  at the time of the sale of the commodity, the risk is limited
to the amount of the deferred option premium. Price insurance  in these test cases is linked to
financing. Producers who receive credit, through their organization,  are required to have price
insurance to cover the repayment of the loan. The financial institution providing credit through the
producer organization then will be willing to provide financing for the purchase of the price insurance
(the put option premium).
It is still too early to evaluate the experience from these test cases as most of them are still
under way.  A challenge  in the ITF approach has been to identify viable producer organizations to
provide risk-management  instruments to their members.  Such organizations  often require  significant
technical  assistance and training to understand the instruments  offered and manage their obligations.
Furthermore,  the risk-management  instruments offered need to be simple and transparent for farmers
to understand  . This has led to the choice,  at least initially, of put options as the practical price
insurance mechanism for a minimal fee (the option  premium).
Originally,  credit risk was considered a major obstacle.  That is, producer organizations
needed some credit enhancement in order to obtain credit or defer the payment for the put option
premium. The test cases so far have indicated that deferred payment for the options or obtaining
credit for the premium is not an issue. Banks that finance these producer organizations  are often
willing to extend credit if this is used to purchase price insurance.  Thus,  the key element of success in
the early cases is linking price insurance with credit.
Another issue is the willingness to pay. Put option premiums  can be expensive exactly at the
times when price insurance is most needed, that is, for longer dated periods and when price volatility
is high. It remains to be seen how much producers will be willing to pay for price insurance.  Of
14course, if insurance is linked to credit, the demand for insurance  is a derived demand for credit.  This
has less elastic  demand and farmers may be willing to pay more in order to access credit that
otherwise would be either more expensive  or rationed.
It may also be observed from these cases, that price risk management  is not really for the
poorest of the poor.  The main clients for such  insurance are commercially-oriented  farmers.  They
may have small land plots but they are producing  a surplus that they market.  They obtain credit and
spend money on inputs.  These are not subsistence farmers  and not the poorest amongst rural people.
This does not mean that price risk management will not contribute to adopting new production
technologies,  and to making new investments that could ultimately  lead to higher household incomes.
But the main beneficiaries will be commercially-oriented  farmers,  including  small ones, while for the
poorest in rural  areas,  social programs  may be rather more appropriate.  This should not diminish the
value of price-risk management  per se, but expectations  should be set realistically.
The replicability and  long-term financial viability of the ITF price-risk-management  approach
is very important.  So far the ITF has tried to identify one or more cooperatives  (or producer
associations) within each country that would retail price insurance to members.  This is fine for the
pilot test phase. However, to continuously  try to identify,  educate and train producer associations  and
cooperatives requires  start-up costs and human resources that can quickly add up to significant
amounts if the exercise moves beyond the test-case phase.  There needs to be a local institution that
could aggregate the function of several cooperatives  and producer organization within a given
country.  A bank or an insurance  company could perhaps play such  a role. Such an organization
should be able to also provide technical assistance to producer organizations along with the risk-
management products.  The ITF would then have to deal with the "local aggregator"  and not with
each individual cooperative or producer association.  The bank, the insurance  company,  or some other
such aggregator would replicate the ITF approach locally, perhaps with technical  assistance  from the
ITF.
YIELD RISK,  CROP INSURANCE AND MARKETS  FOR WEATHER  RISKS
In addition to price risks,  farmers face yield risks, due to mainly adverse weather but also to
other factors such as pests and diseases.  The World Bank has long recognized  the need for yield
insurance but experience  so far with traditional  crop insurance  has been discouraging.  Traditional
crop insurance  has proven to be expensive and riddled with moral-hazard  and adverse-selection
problems. New developments  in weather risk management  markets have provided  new opportunities
to re-think yield insurance  in emerging markets,  and in 2000 the Bank and its International  Finance
Corporation  (IFC) launched a project to investigate  this.
Government-supported  crop insurance has been touted for years as being an important
innovation for helping rural households manage risk.  A market-based,  risk-sharing insurance
alternative  for agriculture has many potential advantages.  If society can reduce the risk from growing
agricultural  commodities,  then the market failure in supplying credit can be addressed.  These
arguments are very seductive  since credit plays a major role in development,  as producers generally
must borrow to invest in new technologies.
Still, there are yet no examples of successful crop insurance  programs without heavy reliance
on government subsidies  (Skees,  Hazell  and Miranda  1999). Providing individual crop insurance
requires significant monitoring  and some form of farm-level  inspection  to verify crop losses. Farm-
level inspection of small plots of land is cost-prohibitive for a private insurance firm. Further, such
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when used for other purposes. Even if crop insurance  could be provided with low government costs
(subsidies),  crop insurance could be of limited value to small farmers  since income from growing
crops is generally  a small proportion of the household portfolio.  For example,  in Mexico only around
20% of the household incomes of small-scale farmers (under 2 ha) comes from own-farm activities
(crops and livestock).
There are,  however,  alternatives for managing and coping with yield risks. These have to do
with making use of recent capital-market  innovations.  In recent years,  much has been written about
the convergence  of traditional  insurance markets and capital  markets (Doherty  1997, Lamm  1997,
Skees 1999).  There are several innovations  in packaging natural-disaster/weather  risk into various
forms of tradable financial  assets.  Some of these instruments  are packaged  as catastrophe bonds;
insurance contracts; weather derivative contracts;  exotic options; or some other derivative financial
instrument.  In any case, they all provide the holder with large amounts of capital contingent  upon the
occurrence of some risky event.  By purchasing these instruments, those holding the risk share  some
of their risk exposure with market investors.  Those selling the instruments earn favorable returns and
are willing to accept the risk as part of a broad-based  diversified portfolio.  These emerging risk-
sharing markets should  open many more doors for innovative,  risk-sharing solutions for weather-
related and natural-disaster  risks.
Although the application of weather-based  index insurance and cat bonds is quite advanced  in
the energy sector and for earthquake insurance,  respectively,  applications  in the agricultural  sector are
still limited. For one, this type of insurance  is new.  Second,  it has to compete with highly subsidized
agricultural  insurance schemes in developed countries.  In other words,  high subsidies for traditional
crop insurance  crowd out the development of weather-based  index products. And third, farmers in
several developed  countries, such as the USA, Canada,  and Australia,  are usually large-scale
commercial  farmers demanding individual loss assessment.
Weather-based  index insurance is a relatively new insurance (or risk-management)  instrument
whose payouts  are based on the occurrence of a weather event,  rather than on actual crop losses
(Skees  1999, Skees, Hazell and Miranda  1999).  Thus, for instance,  in the case of drought, insurance
contracts would be written against severe rainfall shortfalls (say 30 percent or more below a defined
norm) measured  at agreed regional weather stations.  The insurance would be sold in standard units
(for example,  US$10 or $100),  and all buyers would pay the same premium and would receive the
same indemnity payment per unit of insurance if the pre-defined rain shortfall happens.
The key advantage  to this kind of insurance  is that the weather or "trigger"  event (e.g.,  a
rainfall shortage) can be independently verified,  and therefore not subject to the possibilities  of
manipulation that are present when insurance payments  are linked to actual farm losses.  And since
the contracts and indemnity payments are the same for all buyers per unit of insurance, the usual
problems of moral hazard  and adverse selection associated with public crop insurance  are lessened.
Besides, the insurance would be easy to administer,  since there are no individual contracts to write no
on-farm inspections  and no individual  loss assessments.  This can help  make the insurance affordable
to a broad range of people,  including agricultural traders,  shopkeepers and landless workers, whose
incomes are also affected by the insured  events.
Weather  index insurance would be also easy to market.  For example,  it could be sold through
banks,  farm cooperatives,  input suppliers and micro-finance organizations,  as well as being sold
directly to farmers,  perhaps in the same way that lottery tickets  are sold in village stores. Weather
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purchase  such insurance to protect their portfolios against defaults caused by severe weather events.
Similarly,  input suppliers could be the purchasers  of such insurance.  Once financial institutions can
offset the risk with this type of index insurance contracts,  they would be in a better position to expand
credit to farmers,  at perhaps  improved terms.
There are yet only few applications of weather-based  index insurance in the world.  There is
an insurance plan in Canada in the province of Ontario that uses rainfall indexes and another one in
Alberta for maize that uses temperature-heat units. Also,  a private insurance  company in Argentina
is offering a rainfall insurance  contract to a milk-producing cooperative (there is strong positive
correlation between rainfall  and milk yields).  While the overall  number of applications is still
relatively small,  the interest  is growing.  There are several applications of index insurance  in
agriculture not based on rainfall (or temperature)  but on average area yields. Instead of rainfall, the
index that triggers the insurance payments  is based on estimates of the average yield for a county or
other predetermined  area. Area-based yield insurance has similar benefits as weather-based  index
insurance  as long as there is a reliable assessment  of area yields.  Some of the countries that have
developed agricultural insurance products based on area yields are the USA (Skees and Barnett  1999)
provide details on the development of the Group Risk Plan), Canada, Brazil and Morocco, the latter
still on a pilot basis.
There are certain challenges in developing weather  insurance, particularly  in developing
countries.  First, there is a need for reliable historic data that would allow accurate  pricing of the
insurance.  Second, weather stations  need to be secured to increase the confidence of those providing
the insurance.  Automated weather stations and increasingly remote sensing could reduce the risk of
tampering with weather observations at local weather stations.  Third,  farmers may face basis risk.
That is, if rainfall  at the weather station is not highly correlated with rainfall at the individual farm.
This is maybe a problem in regions with diverse microclimates.  But, it is less of an issue if the
purchaser of insurance is a bank (to protect its portfolio)  or a local government or an agribusiness
firm that have weather exposure  over a wider area.
The World Bank group has recognized  the importance of these innovations in weather
insurance and is examining ways to facilitate the use of weather insurance  markets by developing
countries.  The IFC of the World Bank Group is working toward developing weather  indexes in
developing countries.  IFC interest in these innovations  is to assure that developing countries  are not
left behind in the important developments that will  emerge in weather-linked  financial  markets. In
this role, LFC plans to take a financial interest in these markets,  presumably increasing the likelihood
of their success.  A specially funded project was also awarded to a working group within the World
Bank.  This project has investigated the feasibility of developing weather based index contracts for
four countries: Nicaragua;  Morocco;  Ethiopia; and Tunisia.  Since the project began,  several of the
professionals  involved have begun similar investigations  in Mexico  and Argentina at the request of
the respective governments.  The governments  of Turkey,  Brazil, India and Mongolia have also made
similar request.  There is clearly a growing international interest in weather insurance.
Results from the World Bank project-study so far indicate that, overall,  local rainfall
observations  and local yields showed a correlation of around 60-90% in parts of Mexico, Morocco
and Tunisia (Skees et al. 2001).  The correlation was very much dependent  on the location within each
country. For an insurance  premium of 10%,  rainfall insurance  could reduce revenue volatility due to
yield variation by up to 30-35%,  again depending on the location.  In almost all the cases, the interest
in weather (rainfall)  insurance was linked to credit.  Thus, as for price  insurance,  weather insurance  is
17more for commercially-oriented  farmers (including  small-scale),  and less so for subsistence farmers.
However,  governments  could use weather insurance  markets to provide aid to rural households in
case of weather  catastrophes  (severe droughts,  floods, etc.).
There are, however,  challenges and limitations for developing weather insurance instruments
in emerging markets.  As noted, weather insurance may be advanced  in the energy sector but  there
are still few application  in agriculture,  even in developed countries.  Data availability  and reliability,
confidence in the measurements of weather stations and basis risk amongst farmers are key issues
that need to be addressed  in emerging countries.  The degree of applicability of weather insurance will
be dependent  on the country circumstances  and also on locations (areas) within each country.  For
example,  weather  insurance may not be appropriate for areas having frequent weather calamities  and
for areas with many different microclimates,  as well as for areas without reliable weather  data and
weather stations.
NEW LOAN AND HEDGING PRODUCTS BY THE WORLD BANK
In September  1999, the World Bank introduced a new series of lending and hedging products.
For the latter, the Bank introduced  free-standing hedging products linked to borrowers'  IBRD loan
exposures.  The new hedging products are: interest rate  swaps, caps and collars; currency  swaps; and
commodity swaps.  Interest rate swaps would be offered to hedge interest-rate risk on outstanding
single currency loans and the fixed-spread  loan product.  Currency  swaps would be offered to hedge
borrowers'  currency exposures on all EBRD obligations,  including currency pool loans that were not
converted earlier under the conversion offer.  Commodity  swaps would be offered on a pilot basis and
negotiated case-by-case.
The rationale  is that IBRD countries, whose debt-servicing  capacity is heavily dependent  on
specific  commodities,  may benefit from financial  instruments that link the debt-servicing  costs of
their  IBRD loans to movements  in the price of a specific commodity or basket of commodities.  The
Bank further decided not to design specific commodity-based  loans because  it would have been
difficult to undertake the commodity-based  funding  and liability management  required to match the
disbursement periods  of Bank loans while appropriately  managing associated  risks. Thus,  it was
decided that a more effective way to offer the equivalent of commodity-based  loan terms would be to
offer commodity-based  hedges to transform borrowers'  IBRD loan exposures.  Hedges could  be
structured to reduce commodity price-related  risks for both producers and consumers of energy,
mineral and agricultural  products. While these transactions would be expected to be less frequent
than interest rate and currency  hedges, commodity  swaps could provide  substantial benefits to
borrowers in specific  circumstances.8
CONCLUSIONS
During the past fifty years, successful  efforts by governments and  multilateral institutions to
manage commodity markets have been rare and short-lived.  Most countries have come to view
interventionist policies as an impediment to growth and have moved to sharply  reduce or eliminate
domestic  market intervention. Mechanisms to manage  markets are now absent from  standing
8  During the April 28,  1998 "Roundtable Discussion on New Approaches  to Commodity  Price Risk Management in
Developing Countries" co-sponsored  by DEC and SRMPG, participants expressed interest in financial instruments
that could assist developing countries  in managing commodity price volatilities.
18international commodity  agreements.  At the same time, the negative consequences of volatility for
growth and development are increasingly  better understood for both economies  and households.
Strategies  for managing the negative  consequences  of commodity market volatility  have emerged.
These more recent strategies rely more heavily on markets to supplement the many ways
governments  and households manage their risks.  Since the costs of risk-avoidance  can be high,  and
because the capacity for self-insurance  limited, policy makers and development-minded  institutions
are exploring ways in which the reach of markets for risk management  instruments can be extended
for the benefit of households and businesses in developing countries.
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